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Securities Regulation
by John L. Latham*
and
Jenna L. Fruechtenicht*"
This Article surveys significant cases decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit during 1995 and 1996 in the
field of securities regulation. This Article also examines select Supreme
Court decisions and Congressional enactments during this survey period
that affect Eleventh Circuit precedent.
The most significant development during this survey period was the
enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Because the legislation affects a number of historical precedents and
implements substantial changes in the area of securities regulation, this
survey must begin with that Act.
1995
On December 22, 1995, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 ("PSLRA") became law.' The PSLRA was enacted to combat
"strike" suits and other litigation abuses "while maintaining the
I.

THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF

* Partner in the firm of Alston & Bird, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. University of Toledo
(B.A., cure laude with honors, 1976); Emory University (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. Wake Forest
University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1992; J.D., cum laude, 1995). Member, State Bars of
Georgia and North Carolina.
1. The PSLRA was not easily enacted. After being approved by the Senate on
December 5, 1995, by a vote of 65 to 30, and by the House of Representatives on December
6, 1995, by a vote of 320 to 102, the Act was vetoed by President Clinton. The House voted
to override the President's veto on December 20, 1995, by a vote of 319 to 100, and the
Senate voted to override the veto on December 22, 1995, by a vote of 65 to 30. 141 CONG.
REC. S17997 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995); 141 CONG. REc. H14055 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995); 141
CONG. REC. D1496 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995); 141 CONG. REC. H15224 (daily ed. Dec. 20,
1995); 141 CONG. REc. S19180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
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As one of the most
incentive for bringing meritorious actions.'
significant pieces of legislation enacted in the private securities area this
half of the century, the PSLRA will substantially impact the manner in
which the securities laws are litigated.
Because the PSLRA applies only to those actions originally filed after
December 22, 1995,' few cases have been fully litigated under its new
provisions." Nonetheless, much could be and has been written about
this momentous legislation." This Article, however, is meant to serve
only as a brief overview of the latest developments in this circuit; thus,
these authors will merely touch upon the primary areas of reform
implemented by the PSLRA and leave a more thorough discussion of the
Act for another day and another article.'

2. S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
683.
3. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, §§ 108-109,202
Stat. 737 (1995).
4. Although many cases are now progressing under the PSLRA's new provisions, few
published opinions can be found addressing disputes arising thereunder. But see,
Medhekar v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 99 F.3d
325 (9th Cir. 1996); Medical Imaging Ctrs., Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal.
1996); Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc.,
939 F. Supp. 57 (D. Mass. 1996); Edge Partners, L.P. v. Dockser, 944 F. Supp. 438 (D. Md.
1996); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C96-0393, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 25, 1996).
5. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM: THE FIRST YEAR'S EXPERIENCE, (Cornerstone Research Release No. 97.1,
February 27, 1997) [hereinafter "Cornerstone Research"]; Jay B. Kasner, Stephen W.
Hamilton, & Nancy J. McGlynn, The Safe Harborfor Forward.LookingStatements Under
the PrivateSecuritiesLitigation Reform Act of 1995, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 89
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7165, 1996) [hereinafter "Safe
Harbor"]; Joel W. Sternman & Garrett L. Gray, The Origins & Implications of the Joint
and Several Liability & ProportionateFaultProvisions of§ 21D of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 757 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7165, 1996) [hereinafter "Origins & Implications"];
Symposium, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 1 (Aug.
1996).
6. For a discussion of the impact of the PSLRA after one year, see U.S. SECURITIES &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, REPORT TO THE PRESiDENT AND

THE CONGRESS ON THE FutST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITI
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 (April 1997). Found at www.sec.gov/news/studies/Ireform.txt.
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A. Provisionsof the PSLRA Applicable to Both the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act
1. Safe Harbor Provisions. One of the most important aspects of
the PSLRA is the protection from civil liability afforded by the safe
harbor provisions of sections 27A and 21E. Section 102 of the PSLRA
amends the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") by inserting section 27A into the
Securities Act and section 21E into the Exchange Act. These identical
provisions provide a safe harbor from civil liability for both written and
oral forward-looking statements that project, explain, or estimate future
events.7 The safe harbor provisions reflect the chilling effect the threat
of litigation has had on corporate America's willingness to assess its own
future and are intended "to enhance market efficiency by encouraging
companies to disclose forward-looking information."'
The protection afforded by the safe harbor provisions is extended to
forward-looking statements expressly identified as such and "accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors
that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the

7.

A forward-looking statement is defined as:
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income
loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends,
capital structure, or other financial items;
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future operations,
including plans or objectives relating to the products or services of the issuer;
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any such statement
contained in a discussion and analysis of financial condition by the management
or in the results of operations included pursuant to the rules and regulations of
the Commission;
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
(E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, to the extent
that the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by the issuer; or
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items as may be
specified by rule or regulation of the Commission.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 102 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(i)(1),
78u-5(iX1) (Supp. 1997)).
8. H. R. CONF. REP. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.CA.N. 730, 742. The Senate Report also notes, "Fear that inaccurate projections will
trigger the filing of a securities fraud lawsuit has muzzled corporate management. One
study found that over two-thirds of venture capital firms were reluctant to discuss their
performance with analysts or the public because of the threat of litigation." S. REP. No.
98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 695.
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forward-looking statement." In addition, the safe harbor provisions
protect against liability for forward-looking statements deemed to be
immaterial" and statements the plaintiff fails to show were made with
actual knowledge of the statement's falsity or tendency to mislead."
Oral forward-looking statements are protected to the same extent as
written statements as long as the forward-looking statement is identified
as such, accompanied by a cautionary statement explaining "that the
actual results could differ materially from those projected," and, if the
oral statement references additional information contained in a readily
available written document, the document is identified and also fulfills
the statutory requirements for written materials.12
The PSLRA's safe harbor provisions are not of unlimited applicability,
however, for they extend only to the statements of specifically identified
individuals. The individuals protected by the safe harbor are issuers
subject to the reporting requirements of sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Exchange Act, persons acting on behalf of such issuers, outside reviewers
retained by such issuers to make a statement on behalf of that issuer,
or underwriters with respect to information provided by or derived from
such issuers." Quite a few transactions are also expressly excluded
from the protection of the safe harbor provisions-financial statements
prepared according to generally accepted accounting principles, initial4
public offerings, tender offers, and a variety of other transactions.1

9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A), 78u-5(c)(1)(A).
10. Id.
11. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(B), 78u-5(c)(1XB). If the statement is made by a business entity,
then the PSLRA protects against liability for statements made by or approved by an
executive officer if the plaintiff fails to prove the officer had actual knowledge of the
statement's falsity or tendency to mislead. Id.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(2), 78u-5(c)(1XB).
13. Id. §§ 77z-2(i)(1), 78u-5(i)(1).
14. Id. §§ 77z-2(b), 78u-5(b). The safe harbor also does not extend to an issuer who was
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor during the three-year period preceding the date of
the statement or an issuer who was the subject of a judicial decree or order arising out of
certain governmental action. Id These provisions state:
(b) Exclusions
Except to the extent otherwise specifically provided by rule, regulation, or order
of the Commission, this section shall not apply to a forward-looking statement(1) that is made with respect to the business or operations of the issuer, if the
issuer(A) during the 3-year period preceding the date on which the statement was first
made-(i) was convicted of any felony or misdemeanor described in clauses (i) through
(iv) of section 15(bX4)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; or
(ii) has been made the subject of a judicial or administrative decree or order
arising out of a governmental action that-
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However, the legislative history of the Act suggests that the Securities
Exchange Commission ("SEC") should consider adopting regulatory safe
harbors for those forward-looking statements not protected by the
PSLRA.'5 Additionally, the PSLRA itself grants the Commission the
authority to "provide exemptions from or under any provision of this title
... if and to the extent that any such exemption is consistent with the
public interest and the protection of investors."'
Prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, most circuits, including the
Eleventh Circuit in Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Associates, Ltd.,"7

recognized the need to protect certain forward-looking statements and
consequently adopted some form of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine to do

(I) prohibits future violations of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws;
(11) requires that the issuer cease and desist from violating the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws; or
(Il) determines that the issuer violated the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws;
(B) makes the forward-looking statement in connection with an offering of
securities by a blank check company;
(C) issues penny stock,
(D) makes the forward-looking statement in connection with a rollup transaction; or
(E) makes the forward-looking statement in connection with a going private
transaction; or
(2) that is(A) included in a financial statement prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles;
(B) contained in a registration statement of, or otherwise issued by, an
investment company;
(C) made in connection with a tender offer;
(D) made in connection with an initial public offering;
(E) made in connection with an offering by, or relating to the operations of, a
partnership, limited liability company, or a direct participation investment
program; or
(F) made in a disclosure of beneficial ownership in a report required to be filed
with the Commission pursuant to section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
Id.
15. S. REP. NO. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Ses. 17 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 696; H. R. CONF. REP. No. 67, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 745 ("he committee intends for its statutory safe harbor provisions to
serve as a starting point and fully expects the SEC to continue its rulemaking proceedings
in this area.").
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(g), 78u-5(g).
17. 45 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1995). The prevailing parties in the Saitzberg appeal were
represented by Alston & Bird.
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SO." The bespeaks caution doctrine generally places importance upon
the context within which a statement is made.' Thus, "[wihen an
offering document's projections are accompanied by meaningful
cautionary statements and specific warnings of the risks involved, that
language may be sufficient to render the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law." Although the bespeaks
caution doctrine was essentially codified by section 102 of the PSLRA, 2
the legislative history states that the safe harbor provisions are not
intended to entirely replace the bespeaks caution doctrine "or to foreclose
further development of that doctrine by the courts.' 2 Thus, the PSLRA
should not be interpreted as precluding the judiciary from further
molding the bespeaks caution doctrine to supplement the limited
applicability of the new safe harbor provisions.
The need to provide protection for forward-looking statements has
been recognized for some time. Prior to widespread acceptance of the
bespeaks caution doctrine, the SEC, in Rule 175, extended safe harbor
protection to certain forward-looking statements made by issuers in
quarterly (10-Q) and annual (10-K) reports to shareholders.'
The
adoption of the bespeaks caution doctrine by the circuits and the
enactment of the safe harbor provisions of the PSLRA evidence the view

18. The First, Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits are among
those adopting a version of the bespeaks caution doctrine. See, eg., Romani v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 (1st Cir. 1991); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d
Cir. 1986); I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 763 (2d
Cir. 1991); Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994); Krim v. BancTexas
Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435(5th Cir. 1993); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037,
1040 (6th Cir. 1991); Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1977); Moorhead
v. Merrill Lynch, 949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1991); In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig.,
948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir. 1991); Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., Ltd., 45 F.3d
399 (l1th Cir. 1995).
19. Saltzberg, 45 F.3d at 400.
20. Id.
21. The safe harbor provision "is based on aspects of SEC Rule 175 and the bespeaks
caution doctrine." S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.CA.N. 679, 695-96. SEC Rule 175 provides, in part:
A statement within the coverage of paragraph (b) of this section which is made by
or on behalf of an issuer or by an outside reviewer retained by the issuer shall be
deemed not to be a fraudulent statement ... unless it is shown that such
statement was made or reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or was disclosed
other than in good faith.
17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1997). Subsection (b) of Rule 175 sets forth the types of forwardlooking statements protected, and subsection (c) provides the definition of forward-looking
information adopted by Congress in the PSLRA. Id.
22. H. R. CON. REP. No. 67, 104th Cong., 1st Sees. 46, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 745.
23. See id.

1997]

SECURITIES REGULATION

1683

that the protection of certain forward-looking statements should be
extended even further.
The SEC should give serious consideration to extending safe harbor
protection to forward-looking statements made in connection with tender
offers. Although the approach is subject to potential abuse, a target
company should be able to avail itself of the safe harbor protection when
providing forward-looking statements to shareholders to demonstrate
that it has chosen to reject a hostile tender offer because the target
believes it can create greater value for the shareholders through its
business plan.24
2. Class Action Reforms. Another area of the securities practice
strongly impacted by the enactment of the PSLRA is that of class
actions.2 5 Implementing class action reforms, section 101 of the PSLRA
amends the Securities Act by adding section 27(a) and amends the
Exchange Act by adding section 21D(a). These class action provisions
apply to any private action brought by a plaintiff class pursuant to the
securities laws and are intended to curb class action abuses such as "the
use of professional plaintiffs and the race to the courthouse to be the
first to file the complaint."26 Congress also enacted the provisions to
prevent counsel for the class from receiving a disproportionate share of
any award and to require that more meaningful information be provided
to class members. 2'
a. Certification Filed with the Complaint. Sections 27(a)(2) of the
Securities Act and 21D(a)(2) of the Exchange Act set forth new requirements for plaintiffs seeking to serve as a class representative. Each

24. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Networks, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 n.13
(Del. 1994), the Delaware Supreme Court indicated that a board may "just say no" under
the appropriate circumstances to an unsolicited takeover proposal, but did not identify the
circumstances that would justify this approach. The Delaware federal court appeared to

sanction the "just say no" defense in Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995), in which the court refused to require Wallace to redeem its
poison pill in the face of a tender offer which had attracted holders of more than 73% of
Wallace's outstanding shares. The board's refusal to redeem the pill was based on its belief
that Moore's offer was inadequate in light of the potential payoff of Wallace's business
strategy. Extension of the safe harbor provision to tender offers could have provided the
Wallace board with protection for disclosure to its shareholders of the projections upon
which the board based its rejection of the Moore offer.
25. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995: RebalancingLitigation Risks and Rewards for ClassAction Plaintiffs,

Defendants and Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAW. 1009 (Aug. 1996).
26. S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,689.
27. Id. at 12, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 691.
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plaintiff seeking to serve as a representative must provide with the
complaint a sworn certification, personally signed by the plaintiff,
stating "that the plaintiff has reviewed the complaint and authorized its
filing," that the plaintiff did not purchase the security involved in the
lawsuit at the direction of counsel or in order to participate in the
lawsuit, and "that the plaintiff is willing to serve as a representative
party on behalf of a class, including providing testimony at deposition
and trial, if necessary.'
Additionally, the certification filed with the complaint must set forth
all the plaintiff's transactions in the security during the relevant time
period, identify all other actions brought pursuant to the securities laws
within three years of the date of the certification in which the plaintiff
sought to serve as a class representative, and state "that the plaintiff
will not accept any payment for serving as a representative party on
behalf of a class beyond the plaintiff's pro rata share of any recovery,
except as ordered or approved by the court."'
b. Appointment of Lead Plaintiff. The class action provisions of the
PSLRA also require that the first plaintiff to file a complaint publish
notice to class members within twenty days of filing."O The court is
then to consider motions for appointment as lead plaintiff not later than
ninety days after the date the notice is published."' Courts are to
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(2XAXi)-(iii), 78u-4(aX2XAXi)-(iii) provide:
(A) In general
Each plaintiff seeking to serve as a representative party on behalf of a class shall

provide a sworn certification, which shall be personally signed by such plaintiff
and filed with the complaint, that-

(i) states that the plaintiff has reviewed the complaint and authorized its filing;
(ii) states that the plaintiff did not purchase the security that is the subject of
the complaint at the direction of plaintiffs counsel or in order to participate in any
private action arising under this title;
(iii) states that the plaintiff is willing to serve as a representative party on

behalf of a class, including providing testimony at deposition and trial, if
necessary.
Id.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(aX2)(A)(iv)-(vi), 78u-4(aX2XAXiv)-(vi).
30. Id. § 77z-1(aX3XA), 78u-4(a)(3)(A). This notice must be published in a widely
circulated national business-oriented publication or wire service and must advise members

of the purported class "of the pendency of the action, the claims asserted therein, and the
purported class period." The notice must also advise purported class members that any
member may move to serve as lead plaintiff within sixty days of publication. If more than
one complaint is fied asserting substantially the same claim or claims, only the plaintiff
or plaintiffs involved in the first action to be filed are required to publish notice. The
notice required by the PSLRA is in addition to any notice required by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id. §§ 77z-1(aX3XAXi)4iii), 78u-4(a)3XAXi)-(iii).
31. Id. §§ 77z-l(aX3XBXi), 78u-4(aX3XBXi).
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presume that the most adequate plaintiff, and therefore the plaintiff who
should be appointed to be the lead plaintiff, is the plaintiff or group of
plaintiffs who possess "the largest financial interest in the relief sought
by the class." 2 However, to be appointed 'as the lead plaintiff, a
plaintiff must either file a complaint or file a motion to serve as the lead
plaintiff.as
The presumption that the most adequate plaintiff is the one with the
largest financial interest may be rebutted with evidence that the
plaintiff "will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class"
or is subject to unique defenses thereby rendering such plaintiff
incapable of adequately representing the rest of the class.3" However,
discovery aimed at rebutting the most adequate plaintiff presumption
may only be conducted if the plaintiff challenging the presumption first
Once a lead
demonstrates a reasonable basis for the challenge.'
plaintiff is chosen, that plaintiff selects and retains class counsel, subject
to the approval of the court." A person may not serve as lead plaintiff
in more than five securities class actions during any three-year
period."7
While the approach taken by the PSLRA for selection of the lead
plaintiff may eliminate certain historic class action abuses, the
presumption that the plaintiff with the largest claim should be the lead
plaintiff presents the potential for substantial litigation. For instance,
litigation will undoubtedly arise over whether the lead plaintiff bought
or sold based on the same information available to the public and
whether the claims are otherwise typical of the class.'

32. Id. § 77z-l(aX3XBXiii), 78u-4(a)(3XBXiii). This provision is meant "to increase the
likelihood that institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs." S. REP. No. 98, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii), 78u-4(aX3)(BXiii).
34. Id.
35. Id. §§ 77z-l(a)(3XBXiv), 78u-4(aX3XBXiv).
36. Id. §§ 77z-l(aX3XB)(v), 78u-4(aX3XB). This provision was included "to permit the
plaintiff to choose counsel rather than have counsel choose the plaintiff." S. REP. No. 98,
104th Cong., 1st Ses. 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690.
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(aX3)(B)(vi), 78u-4(aX3XB)(vi).
38. The theoretical concern raised by this portion of the PSLRA has already become a
reality in an action filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas against Cellstar Corporation and KPMG Peat Marwick. Gluck v. Ceflstar Corp.,
96CV-1353-H. See Bruce Rubenstein, Pension Fund Picks Bargain-PricedFirm; Finds
Milberg Weiss Too Pricey, 2 U.S. BUSINEss LITIG. (Jan. 1997). In Cellstar, the State of
Wisconsin Investment Board ("SWIB"), the tenth largest pension fund in the United States,
petitioned the court for lead plaintiff status in July of 1996. This petition was granted on
October 1, 1996. Id. Although Milberg Weiss filed a detailed complaint on behalf of
individuals with substantial investments in Cellstar, SWIB chose the less-experienced
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c. Other Class Action Provisions. Other provisions of the PSLRA
relating to class actions prevent representative plaintiffs from recovering
a larger percentage of the final judgment or settlement than the other
members of the class8" and preclude settlements from being filed under
seal, except upon motion of a party showing publication would cause
direct and substantial harm." Additionally, certain restrictions are
placed upon payment of attorney fees; courts are required to determine whether an attorney who represents a class should be disqualified
if the attorney owns or has a beneficial interest in the securities that are
the subject of the litigation;42 and any disclosure of settlement terms
to class members must include specific statements and identify
representatives of plaintiffs' counsel who will be available to answer
questions from class members."

Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley to represent it as lead counsel. Id. Blank, Rome
agreed to a fee that was quite a bit less than that sought by Milberg Weiss. Id. In
addition to the now brewing fight over lead counsel status, the involvement of SWIB raises
other more troubling issues such as SWIB's typicality and adequacy. These issues will
undoubtedly be hotly contested at the pending Rule 23 hearing.
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(4), 78u-4(a)(4). These sections provide:
(4) Recovery by plaintiffs
The share of any final judgment or of any settlement that is awarded to a
representative party serving on behalf of a class shall be equal, on a per share
basis, to the portion of the final judgment or settlement awarded to all other
members of the class. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the
award of reasonable costs and expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to
the representation of the class to any representative party serving on behalf of the
class.

Id.

40. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(5), 78u-4(aX5). These sections provide:
(5) Restrictions on settlements under seal
The terms and provisions of any settlement agreement of a class action shall not
be filed under seal, except that on motion of any party to the settlement, the court
may order filing under seal for those portions of a settlement agreement as to
which good cause is shown for such filing under seal. For purposes of this
paragraph, good cause shall exist only if publication of a term or provision of a
settlement agreement would cause direct and substantial harm to any party.
41. 1& §§ 77z-l(a)(6), 78u-4(aX6).
42. Id. §§ 77z-l(aX8), 78u-4(a)(9).
43. Id. § 77z-1(aX7), 78u-4(a)(7). These sections provide:
(7) Disclosure of settlement terms to class members
Any proposed or final settlement agreement that is published or otherwise
disseminated to the class shall include each of the following statements, along
with a cover page summarizing the information contained in such statements:
(A) Statement of plaintiff recovery
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S. Reforms Applicable to Both the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act
a. Stay of Discovery. Another important provision of the PSLRA,
applicable to all actions filed under the securities laws, imposes a stay
on discovery and other proceedings during the pendency of any motion
to dismiss, "unless the court finds, upon the motion of any party, that
particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent
undue prejudice to that party."" This provision applies to any private
The amount of the settlement proposed to be distributed to the parties to the
action, determined in the aggregate and on an average per share basis.
(B) Statement of potential outcome of case
(i) Agreement on amount of damages
If the settling parties agree on the average amount of damages per share that
would be recoverable if the plaintiff prevailed on each claim alleged under this
title, a statement concerning the average amount of such potential damages per
share.
(ii) Disagreement on amount of damages
If the parties do not agree on the average amount of damages per share that
would be recoverable if the plaintiff prevailed on each claim alleged under this
title, a statement from each settling party concerning the issue or issues on which
the parties disagree.
(iii) Inadmissibility for certain purposes
A statement made in accordance with clause (i) or (i) concerning the amount of
damages shall not be admissible in any Federal or State judicial action or
administrative proceeding, other than an action or proceeding arising out of such
statement.
(C) Statement of attorneys' fees or costs sought
If any of the settling parties or their counsel intend to apply to the court for an
award of attorneys' fees or costs from any fund established as part of the
settlement, a statement indicating which parties or counsel intend to make such
an application, the amount of fees and costs that will be sought (including the
amount of such fees and costs determined on an average per share basis), and a
brief explanation supporting the fees and costs sought.
(D) Identification of lawyers' representatives
The name, telephone number, and address of one or more representatives of
counsel for the plaintiff class who will be reasonably available to answer questions
from class members concerning any matter contained in any notice of settlement
published or otherwise disseminated to the class.
(E) Reasons for settlement
A brief statement explaining the reasons why the parties are proposing the
settlement.
(F) Other Information
Such other information as may be required by the court.
Id.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B). See John F. Olson, David C. Mahaffey &
Brian E. Casey, PleadingReform, PlaintiffQualificationand Discouery Stays Under the
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action filed under either the Securities Act or the Exchange Act and was
implemented to reduce the likelihood that even unmeritorious and
abusive securities class actions would be settled because of the high cost
of discovery to defendants."5 The stay is also intended to prevent
plaintiffs from filing frivolous lawsuits simply as a means of conducting
discovery "ine the hopes of finding a sustainable claim not alleged in the
complaint.""
To prevent relevant evidence from being lost during the pendency of
any stay imposed pursuant to the PSLRA, parties with actual notice of
the allegations in the complaint are required to treat "all documents,
data compilations ... , and tangible objects that are in the custody or
control of such person and that are relevant to the allegations, as if they
were the subject of a continuing request for production of documents
from an opposing party under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ' 7
Sanctions may be imposed for a willful violation of this provision."
b. Sanctions for Abusive Litigation and Elimination of
Certain Abusive Practices. In an attempt "to reduce the economic
incentive to file meritless claims," the PSLRA explicitly provides for the
imposition of sanctions for abusive litigation. 9 Pursuant to section
27(c) of the Securities Act and section 21D(c) of the Exchange Act, a
court must conduct a mandatory review upon final adjudication of an
action as to whether each party and each attorney complied with Rule
11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the court finds a
violation of Rule 11(b), the court must impose sanctions in accordance
with Rule 11. If sanctions are imposed for failure of a responsive
pleading or dispositive motion to comply with Rule 11(b), the court must
presume the appropriate sanction "is an award to the opposing party of
the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct

Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 1101 (Aug. 1996).
45. S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C-.AN.
679, 693.
46. Id. The PSLRA simply uses the term "motion to dismiss." The stay provision is
therefore arguably not limited to motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(bX6).
Additionally, the use of the phrase "discovery and other proceedings' has led one court to
find that the initial disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a) are stayed under this provision.
Medhekar v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 99 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1996).
See alsoPowers v. Eichen, 1997 WL 217571 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (finding third-party subpoenas
subject to PSLRA's stay provisions); Novak v. Kasaks, 1996 WL 467534 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

(same).
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(bX2), 78u-4(bX3XcXi).
48. Id. §§ 77z-1(bX3), 78u-4(bX3XCXii).
49. S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 692.
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result of the violation.' 6° Likewise, the court must presume the
appropriate sanction for the substantial failure of a complaint to comply
with Rule 11(b) "is an award to the opposing party of the reasonable
attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred in the action."51 However,
these presumptions may be rebutted.5 2
Additionally, in an attempt to cure other abusive practices, section 103
of the PSLRA amends section 15(c) of the Exchange Act to prohibit
brokers, dealers, and persons associated with brokers or dealers who
refer cases to an attorney from soliciting or receiving fees for providing
such assistance." In addition, section 20 of the Securities Act and
section 21(d) of the Exchange Act are amended to prohibit distribution
of "funds disgorged as the result of an action brought by the Commission
in Federal court, or as a result of any Commission administrative action"
as payment for attorney fees or other similar types of expenses."
c. Jury Interrogatories. A final provision applicable to both the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act is a provision on jury interrogatories. When requested by a defendant in an action requiring proof that
a defendant acted with a particular state of mind, a court must submit
written interrogatories to the jury on the issue of each defendant's state
of mind at the time of the alleged violation. 55 This provision does not
preclude the submission of interrogatories "concerning the mental state
or relative fault of the plaintiff and of persons who could have been
joined as defendants.'s

50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(cX3)(A)(i), 78u-4(c)(3XAXi).
51. Id. §§ 77z-1(cX3XAXii), 78u-4(cX3)(AXii).
52. Id. §§ 77z-1(c)(3)(B), 78u-4(c)(3XB). The presumptive sanctions may be rebutted
upon a showing by the party or attorney against whom the sanctions are imposed that the
sanction will impose an unreasonable burden and would be unjust, and that the failure to
make the presumptive award would not impose a greater burden on the party in whose
favor sanctions are to be imposed, or that the violation of Rule 11(b) was de minimis. Id.

If the presumption is successfully rebutted, "the court shall award the sanctions that the
court deems appropriate pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id.
§§ 77z-1(cX3XC), 78u-4(cX3)(C).

53. Id. § 78o(8) (Supp. 1997). Although only the Exchange Act is amended, the
prohibition on referral fees also applies to any private action arising under the Securities
Act. Id,
54.

Id. §§ 77t(f), 78u(dX4).

55. Id. §§ 77z-l(d), 78u-4(d).
56.

S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Seas. 18 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.

679, 697-98. The report states as an example that "interrogatories may be appropriate in
contribution proceedings among defendants or ... when some of the defendants have
entered into settlement." Id. See text accompanying supra notes 66-82 for a discussion of

the use of interrogatories in establishing joint and several liability.
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B. Provisions of the PSLRA Applicable Solely to Claims Under the
Exchange Act
1. Uniform Pleading Requirements and Loss Causation. In an
attempt "to establish a uniform and stringent pleading requirement to
curtail the fling of abusive lawsuits,""7 section 101(b) of the PSLRA
amends the Exchange Act to require any complaint predicated upon the
Exchange Act's fraud provisions to "specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading ... [and the] reasons why the statement is
misleading." 8 Additionally, if the plaintiff must prove the defendant
acted with a particular state of mind, "the complaint shall, with respect
to each act or omission alleged to violate [the Act], state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
the required state of mind." 9
A complaint failing to allege fraud or scienter with the required
specificity may be dismissed and "all discovery and other proceedings

67. S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,694.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(bXl). Section 21D(bXl) provides:
(1) Misleading statements and omissions
In any private action arising under this title in which the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding
the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which the belief is formed.
Id. This provision is modeled on the pleading standard of the Second Circuit, but is not
intended "to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard,
although courts may find this body of law instructive." S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st
Sesa. 15 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.AN. 679, 694.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). Section 21D(b)(2) provides:
(2) Required state of mind
In any private action arising under this title in which the plaintiff may recover
money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of
mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate
this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.
Id. A few district courts have recently published opinions discussing the PSLRA's
heightened pleading standards. See Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., No. 96C5817, 1997 WL
136323 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 17, 1997); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Secs. Litig., No. C96-0393
FMS, 1997 WL 285057 (N.D. Cal., May 23, 1997); Rehm v. Eagle Finance Corp., 954 F.
Supp. 1246 (N.D. 111. 1997); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 927
F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431'(N.D. Cal. 1996).
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shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the
court finds ... that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve
evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.' ° Additionally,
plaintiffs must prove that the act or omission alleged to violate the
Exchange Act's fraud provisions actually caused the loss for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover damages.6'
2. Limitation on Damages. Recognizing that "[t]he current method
of calculating damages in 1934 Act securities fraud cases is complex,
with no statutory guidance to provide certainty, 2 the PSLRA attempts
to limit such damages to only those losses actually caused by the fraud
as opposed to other market conditions. The PSLRA seeks to accomplish
this by providing a "bounce back" period for the calculation of damages
when a plaintiff seeks to establish loss by reference to the market price
of a security." In such a case, the plaintiff may not receive more than
the difference between the purchase or sale price paid or received, as

appropriate, by the plaintiff for the subject security and the mean
trading price of that security during the 90-day period beginning on the
date on which the information correcting the misstatement or omission
that is the basis for the action is disseminated to the market."
An exception to this rule is applied if the plaintiff sells or repurchases
the security prior to the expiration of the ninety-day period. In that
case,
the plaintiff's damages shall not exceed the difference between the
purchase or sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff
for the security and the mean trading price of the security during the
period beginning immediately after dissemination of information
correcting the misstatement or omission and ending on the date on
which the plaintiff sells or repurchases the security."

60. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3).

61. Id § 78u-4(bX4).

62. S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.

679, 698.
63. Id.

64. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(eX1). See Jonathon C. Dickey & Marcia Kramer Mayer, Effect
on Rule l0b-5 Damages of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: A Forward

Looking Assessment, 51 Bus. LAW. 1203 (Aug. 1996).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(eX2). The "mean trading price" of a security is defined as the
"average of the daily trading price of that security, determined as of the close of the market
each day during the 90-day period." Id. § 78u-4(e)(3).
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3. Proportionate Liability and Contribution. To remedy "[olne
of the most manifestly unfair aspects of the current system of securities
litigation,' section 201 of the PSLRA eliminates joint and several
liability for nonknowing violations of the Exchange Act and nonknowing
violations by outside directors under section 11 of the Securities Act. 7
In place of joint and several liability, section 21D(g) imposes a "fair
share" system of proportionate liability by which a defendant who is
found liable, but who did not engage in a knowing securities violation,
is only held accountable for its share of the judgment as apportioned by
the fact finder." Joint and several liability remains applicable to a
defendant who engages in a knowing securities violation.6" To impose

joint and several liability, however, the defendant must have had actual
knowledge-reckless conduct will not suffice.70

A nonknowing defendant may also be held jointly and severally liable
in two specifically enumerated instances. If one or more of the
defendants is not able to pay its full share of the amount of liability
attributed to it, and the jointly and severally liable defendants are not
able to cover the difference, then the proportionately liable defendants

66. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g). A knowing violation of the securities laws occurs when:
(i) with respect to an action that is based on an untrue statement of material fact
or omission of a material fact necessary to make the statement not misleading,

if(1) that covered person makes an untrue statement of a material fact, with
actual knowledge that the representation is false, or omits to state a fact
necessary in order to make the statement made not misleading, with actual
knowledge that, as a result of the omission, one of the material representations
of the covered person is false; and
(H) persons are likely to reasonably rely on that misrepresentation or omission;
and
(ii) with respect to an action that is based on any conduct that is not described
in clause (i), if that covered person engages in that conduct with actual knowledge
of the facts and circumstances that make the conduct of that covered person a
violation of the securities laws.
Id. § 78u-4(gX1OXA). The definition also expressly states that reckless conduct does not
constitute a knowing violation. Id. § 78u-4(gX1O)(B). Throughout section 21D(g) the term
"covered persons" is used. A covered person is defined in section 21D(gX1OXC) as a
defendant in any private action arising under the Exchange Act or a defendant in any
private action arising under section 11 of the Securities Act who is an outside director. 15
U.S.C. § 78u4(gX1O)(C).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2XB); S. REP. NO. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. 679, 701.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(gX2)(A).
70. Id. § 78u-4(gX1OXB).
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are jointly and severally liable for the uncollectible share if the plaintiff
establishes (1) "the plaintiff is an individual whose recoverable damages
under the final judgment are equal to more than 10 percent of the net
worth of the plaintiff;" and (2) "the net worth of the plaintiff is equal to
less than $200,000." Additionally, if one or more of the defendants is
unable to pay, but the plaintiff fails to establish the foregoing, then each
proportionately liable defendant is liable for the uncollectible share in
proportion to the percentage of responsibility imposed on that defendant,
but the total liability of any defendant may not exceed fifty percent of
that defendant's proportionate share.7 2 Any defendant who is required
to make an additional payment under the uncollectible share provision
may seek contribution from other enumerated parties.7"
Importantly, contribution may not be sought from a defendant who
settles at any time before the final verdict or judgment. Section
21D(g)(7) expressly discharges such settling defendants from all claims
for contribution and requires that "[ulpon entry of the settlement by the
court, the court shall enter a bar order constituting the final discharge
of all obligations to the plaintiff of the settling covered person arising out
of the action. 74 The PSLRA also imposes a uniform method of judg-

71. Id. § 78u-4(gX4XAXi).
72. Id. § 78u-4(gX4XA)(ii).
73. Id. § 78u-4(gX5). To the extent a defendant is required to make an additional
payment pursuant to the uncollectible share provision, that defendant may recover
contribution
(A) from the covered person originally liable to make the payment;
(B) from any covered person liable jointly and severally pursuant to (the joint and
several liability provision for knowing violations]; (C) from any covered person
held proportionately liable pursuant to this paragraph who is liable to make the
same payment and has paid less than his or her proportionate share of that
payment; or (D) from any other person responsible for the conduct giving rise to
the payment that would have been liable to make the same payment.
Id.
74. Id. § 78u-4(g)(7). This sections provides, in part:
(7) Settlement discharge
(A) In general
A covered person who settles any private action at any time before final verdict
or judgment shall be discharged from all claims for contributions brought by other
persons. Upon entry of the settlement by the court, the court shall enter a bar
order constituting the final discharge of all obligations to the plaintiff of the
settling covered person arising out of the action. The order shall bar all future
claims for contribution arising out of the action(i) by any person against the settling covered person; and
(ii) by the settling covered person against any person, other than a person whose
liability has been extinguished by the settlement of the settling covered person.
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ment reduction in the event one or more defendants settle. Any verdict
or judgment against the remaining defendants must be reduced by the
greater of an amount corresponding to the percentage of responsibility
of the settling defendant or the amount of the settlement paid by that
defendant to the plaintiff.75 A defendant who becomes jointly and
severally liable may nonetheless "recover contribution from any other
person who, if joined in the original action, would have been liable for
the same damages." 6
Because this proportionate liability section of the PSLRA is dependent
upon the distinction between a knowing and nonknowing violation of the
Exchange Act or section 11 of the Securities Act, juries in cases involving
such claims must answer special interrogatories, or the court must make
findings, "with respect to each covered person and each of the other
persons claimed by any of the parties to have caused or contributed to
the loss incurred by the plaintiff, including persons who have entered
into settlements."77 These interrogatories or findings must answer
three questions: "(i) whether such person violated the securities laws;
(ii) the percentage of responsibility of such person, measured as a
percentage of the total fault of all persons who caused or contributed to
the loss incurred by the plaintiff; and (iii) whether such person
knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws."7
Interestingly, although the third interrogatory above requires a
finding as to a defendant's actual knowledge, the proportionate liability
subsection of the PSLRA is not intended to "be construed to create,
affect, or in any manner modify, the standard for liability associated
with any action arising under the securities laws." 9 Most courts since

75. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(7)(B). Subsection (B) provides:
(B) Reduction
If a covered person enters into a settlement with the plaintiff prior to final verdict
or judgment, the verdict or judgment shall be reduced by the greater of- (i) an
amount that corresponds to the percentage of responsibility of that covered person;
or (ii) the amount paid to the plaintiff by that covered person.
Id.
76. Id. § 78u-4(g)8). The claim for contribution is to be determined according to the
percentage of responsibility of the claimant and each person against whom a claim for
contribution is made, id., and any action for contribution must be brought within six
months after entry of the final judgment unless the action involves a payment made
pursuant to the uncollectible share provision. Id. § 78u-4(gX9). In that case the action for
contribution must be brought not later than six months after the date the payment is
made. Id.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(gX3)(A).
78. Id. § 78u-4(gX3)(AXi)-(iii).
79. Id. § 78u-4(g)(1).
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Ernst & Ernst v. HochfeldersP have ruled that recklessness satisfies the
scienter element in a Rule 10b-5 action and that section 11 typically
requires no proof of actual knowledge."1 Thus, in requiring plaintiffs
seeking to hold a defendant jointly and severally liable to prove the
defendant actually knew its representations were false, the PSLRA's
proportionate liability provisions impose a stricter liability standard for
joint and several liability than is required to prove liability by itself.8 2
4. Auditor Disclosure Under PSLRA. Although most of the
PSLRA's provisions are designed to curb litigation abuses by plaintiffs,
certain aspects are regarded as directed toward enhanced enforcement
of the federal securities laws. One such provision requires auditors of
public companies to blow the whistle on illegal acts committed by their
cients.8s The PSLRA requires the auditor to advise its client of any
illegal act discovered by the auditor. If the company fails to take the
necessary corrective action, the auditor may be forced to resign or report
the misconduct to the SEC. 8 ' Although the PSLRA does not create a
private right of action against the auditor for failing to discharge its
whistle blower duties, the auditor may be subject to SEC administrative
sanctions if it does not do so. 85
Final Comments on the Reforms Implemented by the PSLRA
The foregoing discussion of the PSLRA touches upon the major areas
of reform implemented by the PSLRA. Additional measures include
section 104, which amends section 20 of the Exchange Act to allow the
SEC to prosecute aiding and abetting.86 Also, section 105 amends
C.

80. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Eleventh Circuit has held that proof of severe
recklessness is sufficient to sustain a Rule lOb-5 cause of action. Woods v. Barnett Bank
of Ft. Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 772 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.
1985).

81. Section 11 is essentially a strict liability offense, imposing liability without
requiring proof that the defendant knew the registration statement contained an untrue
statement or omitted a material fact. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(gX10).
82. Lack of proof of intent would not preclude a finding of liability, it would simply
preclude a finding of joint and several liability. If the plaintiff fails to prove intent, the
defendant could still be held proportionately liable.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1. The audit disclosure provisions are found in Title III of the
PSLRA. Phillips & Miller, supra note 25.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(1)-(3).
85. Id. 78j-1(d).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (Supp. 1997). The adoption of section 104 ends the debate over
the ability of the SEC to prosecute actions for aiding and abetting following the Supreme
Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164 (1994), in which the Court held there was no private cause of action for aiding and
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section 12 of the Securities Act to preclude the recovery of damages not
actually caused by the misrepresentation or omission in the prospectus
or oral communication that formed the basis for the defendant's
liability.8 7 Section 107 amends 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) to prevent a
noncriminal securities violation from serving as a predicate act under
the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act. 88
Congress was prompted to enact these and the other provisions of the
PSLRA by significant evidence of abuse in the private securities practice
area. As noted by the Senate Report and the Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Conference Committee, the filing of abusive and
unmeritorious lawsuits is both costly to our national economy and a
disservice to all but those who thrive on such techniques.8 " Not only
is corporate America now unwilling to discuss publicly any matters of
substance with any amount of depth, but those investors who are
legitimately harmed by fraudulent conduct often recover only a small
portion of their losses due to the self-interested manipulations of some
class counsel. The PSLRA was enacted to curb these and other abuses
and to regain investor confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the
United States securities markets90
Although the long-term effects of the PSLRA remain to be seen, the
impact of the Act is necessarily limited because it does not presently
alter securities litigation under common law or state blue sky provisions.
Consequently, one anticipated result of the PSLRA is an increase in the
number of securities-related actions filed in state court. In fact, it
appears this trend has already begun." State court filings serve as a
means of avoiding the stricter pleading requirements under the PSLRA
and of evading the stay on discovery. Additionally, individual investors
who turn to state court proceedings are able to avoid a fight with
institutional investors over class representation. Thus, if the PSLRA is
to truly have the far-reaching effects Congress intended, the states must

abetting under Rule 10b-5. For a discussion of the applicability of Central Bank to SEC
enforcement actions prior to the PSLRA, see Edward C. Brewer, III & John L. Latham,
SEC v. Central Bank: A Draft Opinion for the Court's Conference, 50 BUS. LAW. 19 (Nov.
1994); Simon M. Lorne, Symposium, The CentralBank Decision: The Demise ofAiding and
Abetting? Central Bank of Denver v. SEC, 49 Bus. LAW. 1467 (Aug. 1994). See also SEC
v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1996).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 771(b) (Supp. 1997).
88. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 202
Stat. 737 (1995) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
89. Id.
90. S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
687.
91. See, e.g., Dominic Bencivenga, Litigation Re.Formed: Lawyers Report on Tear 1
Under SecuritiesAct, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 16, 1997).
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adopt provisions similar to those of the PSLRA or the PSLRA must be
found to preempt state law altogether.
II. THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Scope of Section 12(2)
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act prohibits the sale of a security
through the use of a false or misleading prospectus. Specifically, it
provides, in part:

A.

Any person who ...

offers or sells a security ... by means of a

prospectus or oral communication, which includes-an untrue statement
of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statement, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading ...

shall be liable to the person

purchasing such security from him.
In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.," the Supreme Court declined to extend the
remedies provided by section 12(2) to private or secondary market
transactions, concluding instead that "[tihe intent of Congress and the
design of the statute require that [section] 12(2) liability be limited to
public offerings.'
Gustafson involved the sale of Alloyd, Inc., a plastic packaging and
automatic heat sealing equipment manufacturer. The contract of sale
included assurances that Alloyd's financial situation had not changed
materially in the time between the date of the last balance sheet and the
date the agreement was executed. The contract also provided that if
Alloyd's final year-end audit and financial statements showed its actual
value was not as high as the estimated value, the disappointed party
would receive an adjustment." When the year-end audit showed
Alloyd's actual earnings were lower than what was estimated, the
buyers, rather than seeking the adjustment to which they were entitled,
sought to rescind the contract under section 12(2) of the Securities
Act.9 The buyers claimed the statements made by the sellers regarding the financial data of the company were inaccurate and untrue and
that because the contract of sale was a "prospectus," they were entitled
to rescission under section 12(2). 7

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

15 U.S.C. § 771.
115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
1& at 1071.
1d. at 1065.
Id.
Id.
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The district court granted summary judgment for the sellers, finding
section 12(2) to be applicable only to claims involving initial stock
offerings." On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's
judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of its decision
in Pacific Dunlop Holdings,Inc. v. Allen & Co." In PacificDunlop, the
Seventh Circuit had defined the term prospectus broadly to include all
written communications offering the sale of a security.1'
In reversing the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court assumed the
stock purchase agreement involved in Gustafson contained material
misstatements of fact.101 Thus, if those misstatements were made "by
means of a prospectus or oral communication," the buyer would have a
right to rescission under section 12(2).12 The disposative question was
therefore "whether the contract... [was] a 'prospectus' as the term is
°
used in the 1933 Act."'O
In addressing the issue of whether the
contract was a prospectus, the Court focused on three sections of the
Securities Act: sections 2(10), 10, and 12.
Section 10 of the Securities Act sets forth the type of information a
prospectus must contain. Section 10 provides, in pertinent part, "Except
to the extent otherwise permitted or required pursuant to this subsection
or subsections (c), (d), or (e)... a prospectus relating to a security...
shall contain the information contained in the registration statement."10 ' In examining the definition provided by section 10, the
Court determined, "whatever else 'prospectus' may mean, the term is
confined to a document that, absent an overriding exemption, must
include the 'information contained in the registration statement."'"1 5
The Court further noted that "[bly and large, only public offerings by an
issuer of a security, or by controlling shareholders of an issuer, require
the preparation and filing of registration statements."' 06 There was no
dispute that the contract at issue in Gustafson was not required under
any provision of the Securities Act to contain information from a
registration statement, nor was a statutory exemption required to take
the contract outside the purview of section 10.107 The Court therefore

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993).
115 S. Ct. at 1065.
Id. at 1066.

Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77j).

105. I&at 1067.
106. Id.
107. 1d
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concluded the contract for sale in Gustafson was not a prospectus under
section 10 .1"5
Having defined the term prospectus under section 10, the Court next
determined the term could not be given different meanings under
sections 10 and 12.'05 The Court pointed to the structure of the 1933
Securities Act, stating, "Nowhere in the statute... do the terms f'ormal
prospectus' or 'informal prospectus' appear. Instead, the Act uses one
11
term--'prospectus-throughout."
The Court also noted that when
the term prospectus is read in conjunction with the definition contained
in section 2(10),"' "it is apparent that the list refers to documents of
wide dissemination ... [and] not face-to-face or telephonic conversations." 112 Additionally, the Court found that "[tihe use of the term
prospectus to refer to public solicitation explains as well Congress'
decision to start in [section] 12(2) to grant buyers a right to rescind
without proof of reliance.""'
In conclusion, the Court stated in Gustafson that "the word 'prospectus' is a term of art referring to a document that describes a public
offering of securities by an issuer or controlling shareholder."" 4
Consequently, because the contract of sale in Gustafson and its
recitations were not held out to the public and were not a prospectus
under the Securities Act, the buyers had no right to rescind the
contract." 5 This decision is therefore in accord with the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in First Union Discount Brokerage Services, Inc. v.
Milos."' In First Union, the Eleventh Circuit determined section 12(2)
does not apply to aftermarket securities transactions. 7

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1068.
111. Section 2(10) states, "[tihe term 'prospectus' means any prospectus, notice,
circular, advertisement, letter or communication, written or by radio or television which
offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security." Id. at 1069.
112. 115 S. Ct. at 1070.
113. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1933)). The Court found it
understandable that Congress would allow a buyer to rescind, without proof of fraud or
reliance, "as to misstatements contained in a document prepared with care, following wellestablished procedures relating to investigations with due diligence and in the context of
a public offering by an issuer or its controlling shareholders." Id. at 1071. However, the
Court did not find it "plausible to infer that Congress created this extensive liability for
every casual communication between buyer and seller in the secondary market." Id.
114. Id. at 1073-74.
115. Id.
116. 997 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1993).
117. Id. at 843-44. For a thorough discussion of First Union, see John Latham & Jay
Sloman, Securities Regulation, 46 MERCER L. REv. 1463, 1463-67 (1995).
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III. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
A.

Limitations Periodfor Section 10(b) Causes of Action
In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court resolved a
split among the circuits concerning the constitutionality of section 27A(b)
of the Exchange Act. Section 27A(b) allowed cases instituted prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson,' but subsequently dismissed as time-barred pursuant
to Lampf, to be reinstated if the claim would have been timely under the
limitation period that existed prior to Lampf 120
Plautarose because section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not provide
a limitations period for securities fraud actions brought pursuant to its
provisions or Rule 10b-5121 promulgated thereunder. Thus, prior to
June 20, 1991, the limitations period for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
actions varied from one to five years, depending upon which law, federal
or state, each circuit determined was applicable to such actions."m The
Eleventh Circuit applied the period of limitations'prescribed by the most
analogous state statute.m On June 20, 1991, however, the United
States Supreme Court announced a uniform limitations period for all
claims brought pursuant to section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.' 24 In Lampf,
the Court decided that all claims "instituted pursuant to [section] 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 ... must be commenced within one year after the
discovery of the facts12 constituting the violation and within three years
after such violation." 5

118.
119.
120.
121.

115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
501 U.S. 350 (1991).
115 S. Ct. at 1450-51.
Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78j, provides:

[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
ofany national security exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to

defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in

any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (1992).
122. For a thorough discussion of limitations periods for section 10(b) actions prior to
Plaut, see John Latham & James Shuchart, Securities Regulation, 44 MERCER L. REV.
1281, 1288-95 (1993).
123. Smith v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1990).
124. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 362.
125. Id. at 364. For a discussion of Lampf, see Latham & Shuchart, supra note 122.
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On the same day the Supreme Court decided Lampf, the Court also
decided James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia."2 In Beam, the
Court stated that new rules of federal law made applicable to the parties
in the case in which the rule is announced must also be applied to all
cases pending on direct review.'" Thus, the Lampf decision, which
was made applicable to the Lampf parties, was applicable to all cases
pending on direct review.'" The combined effect of Lampf and Beam
was therefore to provide a uniform statute of limitations for section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 causes of action in all cases decided subsequent to or
reviewed subsequent to June 19, 1991.
Six months after Lampf and Beam were decided, Congress responded
to the controversy surrounding the retroactive effect of the Lampf
decision by enacting section 27A of the Exchange Act."2 Section 27A
provides:
(a) Effect on pending causes of action
The limitation period for any private civil action implied under
section 10(b) of this Act that was commenced on or before June 19,
1991, shall be the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in
the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws

existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action
Any private civil action implied under section 10(b) of this Act that
was commenced on or before June 19, 1991(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19,
1991, and

(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles
of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be
reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after
[December 19, 1991].'s°
Thus, in section 27A, Congress attempted to overrule the combined effect
of Lampf and Beam. In Plaut," however, the Supreme Court determined section 27A(b) violates the Constitution's separation of powers

126. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
127. Id. at 543-44.
128. 501 U.S. at 364.
129. Section 27A was enacted as part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa-1).
130. Id.
131. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995)
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doctrine
to the extent it requires federal courts to reopen final judg12
ments. 3
In Plaut, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky relied on section 27A to reinstate a dismissed action originally
brought pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The petitioners'
action was first filed in 1987, but became caught up in pretrial
proceedings until June 20, 1991, when the Supreme Court decided
Lampf and Beam. The district court subsequently dismissed petitioners'
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions as untimely pursuant to the statute
of limitations established in Lampf. Petitioners did not appeal the
court's ruling and the judgment became final thirty days later."
Shortly after the Plaut dismissal became final, section 27A of the
Exchange Act was signed into law. Petitioners therefore returned to the
district court seeking reinstatement of their action. Because their action
had been dismissed as time barred on August 13, 1991, but would have
been timely under the applicable limitations period as it existed prior to
June 19, 1991, the district court determined the conditions set out in
section 27A had been met. Thus, under the terms of the statute,
petitioners' motion should have been granted. The court nonetheless
denied petitioners' motion for reinstatement, concluding section 27A(b)
was unconstitutional.'
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed, and certiorari was granted on June 6, 1994.35 The Supreme
Court subsequently affirmed the Sixth Circuit."'
In affirming the Sixth Circuit, the Court issued a lengthy opinion
heavily entrenched in historical references predating the Constitution.
The gravamen of this opinion was the Court's determination that "there
is no reasonable construction on which [section] 27A(b) does not require
federal courts to reopen final judgments in suits dismissed with
prejudice by virtue of Lampf."-1 7 The Court concluded that section 27A(b) therefore offended the "deeply rooted postulate of Article III"
that the judicial department is vested with the "'province and duty... to say what the law is' in particular cases and controversies."'85
By requiring courts to reopen final judgments, the Court found that
section 27A(b) impermissibly invaded the exclusive power of the judicial

132. Id at 1459. Plaut therefore overrules the Eleventh Circuit case of Henderson v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992) (determining section 27A was
constitutional and applying it to the case at bar).
133. 115 S. Ct. at 1451.
134. Id.

135. 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994).

136. 115 S. Ct. at 1452.
137. Id
138. I& at 1453 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
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branch "not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review
only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy-with an understanding, in short, that 'a judgment conclusively resolves the case' because 'a
"judicial Power" is one to render dispositive judgments.'" 18 Thus,
section 27A(b) was found to be unconstitutional.1'
The Court rejected as irrelevant petitioners' argument that section 27A(b) was constitutional because the final judgments reopened by
the statute involved statute of limitations provisions which are "mere
creatures of Congress."14 1 The Court stated that the issue involved in
Plaut was "not the validity or even the source of the legal rule that
produced the Article III judgments, but rather the immunity from
legislative abrogation of those judgments themselves."'42 The Court
also rejected petitioners' comparison of section 27A(b) to Rule 60(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'" The Court stated that Rule
60(b) does not impose a legislative mandate to reopen final judgments
as in section 27A(b), but instead serves as a reflection and confirmation
of "the courts' own inherent and discretionary power... to set aside a
judgment whose enforcement would work inequity."'
The Court emphasized that the problem perpetuated by section 27A(b)
was that it nullified prior authoritative judicial action'" and deprived
judicial judgments of the conclusive effect they had when they were
announced.'" Thus, the Court found section 27A(b) to embody the
very sort of risk the separation of powers doctrine was intended to
avoid. 4 7 The Court described the separation of powers doctrine as a
structural safeguard and "a prophylactic device, establishing high walls
and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions are not
judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict."'" Thus, the
Court concluded, "[t]o the extent that it requires federal courts to reopen

139.
L. REV.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40 CASE W. RES.
905, 926 (1990)).
Id.
Id. at 1458.
Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a court to "relieve a peaty... from

a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for reasons such as mistake, newly discovered
evidence, or "any other reason justifying relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
144. 115 S. Ct. at 1460.
145. Id. at 1462-63.
146. Id. at 1457.
147. Id. at 1463.
148. Id.
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final judgments entered before its enactment," section 27A(b) was
unconstitutional. 41' 9
The issue raised by Plaut was also recently visited by the Eleventh
Circuit in Raven v. Oppenheimer & Co."6

In Raven, plaintiffs' sec-

tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims had been dismissed as time barred on
October 16,1991, in accordance with Lampf. Following the enactment
of section 27A, plaintiffs filed a motion to reinstate their claims pursuant
to section 27A(b) or, in the alternative, under the authority of section
27A(a) and Rule 60(b). The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia ruled section 27A was constitutional in its
entirety and granted plaintiffs' motion to reinstate their claims. 5 ' The
court also found merit in plaintiffs' arguments under Rule 60(b) and
granted that motion independently. 5 ' Plaut was decided shortly
thereafter.
On appeal, the plaintiffs conceded subsection (b) of section 27A was
unconstitutional based on Plaut, but maintained reinstatement was
permissible pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).'" The Eleventh Circuit determined the district court's application of Rule 60(b)(6) was premised upon
the court's perception that section 27A(a) established a new statute of
limitations for all section 10(b) actions filed on or before June 19,
199 1 .1'

The Eleventh Circuit concluded this was an incorrect inter-

pretation of the statute, noting that when subsection (a) was read in
conjunction with subsection (b) it was clear the term "any" in subsection
(a) was not designed to include lawsuits dismissed as time-barred after
June 19, 1991, since such actions were governed by subsection (b). 5
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court abused its
discretion in granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief premised upon the applicability of
section 27A(a).' The lower court's order was therefore vacat57
ed.1

B. Effect of Class Settlements in State Court Proceedings
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,"6 the Supreme

Court confronted the issue of whether a federal court was required to
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

I&
74 F.3d 239 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 241.
Id at 242.
Id.
Id.
I at 243.
Id.
116 S. Ct. 873 (1996).
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afford full faith and credit to a state court judgment approving a classaction settlement when the state court settlement purported to release
claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Full
Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, states in pertinent part, "judicial
proceedings ... [of any state] shall have the same full faith and credit
in every court within the United States... as they have by law or usage
in the courts of such State... from which they are taken.""' 9
Matsushita arose after two class actions were filed following a tender
offer by Matsushita for the common stock of MCA, Inc."6 The first
class action was filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery against MCA
for breach of fiduciary duty and waste of corporate assets and against
Matsushita for conspiracy. Shortly after the state action was filed,
another class action was filed in California federal court. This action
involved claims brought under SEC Rules 10b-3161 and 14d-10,62
promulgated pursuant to provisions of the Exchange Act of 1934. Claims
brought pursuant to the Exchange Act are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.' 6
The California district court declined to certify the federal class and
dismissed the action. The plaintiffs subsequently appealed the dismissal
to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Before the Ninth Circuit
delivered its opinion, however, the class in the state court action
The Delaware court subsequently certified
negotiated a settlement.'
the class for purposes of settlement and approved notice of the proposed
settlement in accordance with Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23,
which is modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1" Both the
notice distributed to class members and the order and final judgment of
the Delaware court provided that any member of the settlement class
who did not validly request exclusion from the class released all rights
to bring further causes of action for acts arising out of the MCA tender

159.

28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).

160. 116 S. Ct. at 876.
161. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-3. Rule 10b-3 provides that it is unlawful for any broker or
dealer or any municipal securities dealer to use or employ "any act, practice, or course of
business defined by the Commission to be included within the term 'manipulative,
deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance,' as such term is used in section 15(c)(1)
of the [Exchange Act]." Id.
162. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10. Rule 14d-10 provides for equal treatment of security
holders when a tender offer is made. Id
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. Claims brought under the Securities Act may be filed in either
state or federal court. Id.
164. 116 S. Ct. at 876.
165. I&
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offer."e The California federal action was specifically referenced in
this portion of the notice." 7
Following confirmation of the settlement by the Delaware Court of
Chancery, Matsushita argued in the Ninth Circuit that pursuant to the
Full Faith and Credit Act the state court judgment barred any further
prosecution of the federal action. The Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument, stating that the Full Faith and Credit Act was limited to
claims that "could ... have been extinguished by the issue preclusive
effect of an adjudication of the state claims."" The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit, determining as an initial matter that the fact
the judgment at issue was the result of a class action did not undermine
the applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Act, nor was the Act
"irrelevant simply because the judgment in question might work to bar
the litigation of exclusively federal claims.""
In concluding the Full Faith and Credit Act was applicable to the
judgment confirming the settlement of the Delaware action, the Court
relied on its previous decision of Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopedic Surgeons7 to formulate a two-part test to be used by
federal courts in determining the preclusive effect to be given a state
court judgment.'
In accordance with this test, the Court first looked
to the law of the state rendering the judgment to ascertain the effect of
the judgment in the courts of that state. 7 2 The Court concluded the
Delaware settlement in Matsushita would have served as a bar to any
subsequent pursuit of the federal claims in the Delaware courts,
notwithstanding the fact that such claims could not have been raised in
the state court action initially.7 ' Thus, because respondents did not
deny they were part of the plaintiff class in the Delaware settlement, nor
did they deny they failed to opt out of the class, the Court determined
the settlement
judgment "would be res judicata under Delaware
174
law."

The Court next considered "whether [section] 27 of the Exchange Act,
which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts for suits

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 665 (9th Cir. 1995).
169. 116 S. Ct. at 878.
170. 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
171. 116 S. Ct. at 878.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 879-80. The Court noted that in Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d
1089 (Del. 1989), the Delaware Supreme Court approved a class action settlement "that
released claims then pending in federal court." Matsushita, 116 S. Ct. at 879.
174. 116 S. Ct. at 880-81.
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The Court

[wihile [section] 27 prohibits state courts from adjudicating claims
arising under the Exchange Act, it does not prohibit state courts from
approving the release of Exchange Act claims in the settlement of suits
over which they have properly exercised jurisdiction, i.e., suits arising
under state176
law or under federal law for which there is concurrent
jurisdiction.
The Court noted, "As an historical matter, we have seldom, if ever, held
that a federal statute impliedly repealed [section] 1738."177 The Court
further noted that although the Exchange Act confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the federal courts for the adjudication of claims arising
thereunder, the language of the Exchange Act does not prohibit the
release of such claims in a settlement achieved in a different forum.178
Additionally, the Court noted it had already determined in a prior
decision that parties could waive the right to bring their Exchange Act
claims in federal court by agreeing to arbitrate instead. 179 The Court
therefore concluded, "state court litigants ought also to be able to waive,
or 'release,' the right to litigate Exchange Act claims in a federal forum
as part of a settlement agreement."180 Accordingly, the Court held that
although federal courts are the only forum in which such claims may be
adjudicated, "there is no 'universal right to litigate a federal claim in a
federal district court.'"'8 1 The state court settlement in Matsushita
was therefore granted preclusive effect in the federal court action. 12

175. Id. at 881.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. "[A] statute confirming exclusive federal jurisdiction for a certain class of
claims does not necessarily require resolution of those claims in a federal court." Id. at
883.
179. Id. at 883 (discussing Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987)).
180. Id.
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id. In its conclusion, the Court also clarified why the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction exception to the Full Faith and Credit Act was not applicable to the case before
it. Id. at 884. The Court distinguished Matsushita,where the state court clearly possessed
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the underlying suit, from a case in which the
complaint alleges violations of the Exchange Act and the state court impermissibly renders
a judgment on the merits of those claims. Id. In the first instance, the subject matter
jurisdiction exception is not applicable, whereas in the second instance, the exception
precludes application of the Act because the state court would improperly rule on a matter
for which it lacks jurisdiction. ld.
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Control Person Liability Under Section 20(a)
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable .... s'

Although regulations promulgated under the Exchange Act define
control as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,"1' the
circuits are not in agreement "on exactly how a plaintiff is to meet [its]
burden" to show that a defendant is a controlling person.185 In Brown
v. Enstar Group, Inc.,"s the Eleventh Circuit set forth the test to be
followed in this circuit in determining control person liability under
section 20(a).
In devising the control person test to be followed in this circuit, the
Eleventh Circuit combined the requirements outlined in two decisions of
the former Fifth Circuit.8 7 The Eleventh Circuit first paraphrased the
Fifth Circuit's holding in Pharo v. Smith,' stating, "a defendant who
did not have the power to control the management of a company or the
company itself could not be liable as a controlling person under Section
20(a)."' 89 The court next looked to a subsequent Fifth Circuit decision
imposing liability on a defendant as a control person because the
defendant "had the requisite power to directly or indirectly control or
influence corporate policy.""s In combining these two Fifth Circuit
decisions, the Eleventh Circuit concluded,
a defendant is liable as a controlling person under Section 20(a) if he
or she "had the power to control the general affairs of the entity
primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws...
[and] had the requisite power to directly or indirectly control or

183. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
184. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1995).
185. Brown v. Enstar Group, Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 950 (1997).
186. 84 F.3d at 393.
187. Id. at 396.
188. 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980).
189. 84 F.3d at 396.
190. G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958 (5th Cir. 1981).
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influence the specific corporate policy which resulted in the primary
liability."91
The court further noted, "Ofcourse, the plaintiff must also establish that
the controlled person violated the securities laws."'
This test for controlling person liability developed by the Eleventh
Circuit in Enstar is different in one important aspect from the test
established by the Eighth Circuit and cited approvingly by the Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.193 The Eighth Circuit, in Metge v.
Baehler,' 4 stated that in order to establish control person liability, a
plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant actually participated in the
operations of the corporation, and (2) that the defendant had the power
to control the specific action upon which liability is predicated."9 The
plaintiff in Metge was required to show the defendant actually exercised
power over the entity it purportedly controlled.'" In Enstar, the
Eleventh Circuit did not reach the issue of "whether 'power to control the
general affairs of the entity primarily liable' means simply abstract
power to control, or actual exercise of the power to control."1" Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit test does not yet preclude liability based on
abstract rather than actual power to control.
IV.

THE INVESTMENT ADVISORS ACT

In addressing an issue of first impression under the Investment
Advisors Act, the Eleventh Circuit determined in United States v.
Elliott"N that an adviser-client relationship was not necessary for the
imposition of liability under the Investment Advisors Act. In Elliott, a
group of investment companies owned and managed by Charles Elliott

191. 84 F.3d at 396 (quoting Brown v. Mendel, 864 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (M.D. Ala.
1994)).
192. Id. at 396-97. In Enstar, plaintiffs asserted claims against Perry Mendel
("Mendel"), the founder of Kinder-Care, Inc., as a control person for allegedly material
omissions and fraud in the dissemination of a prospectus issued to Kinder-Care's
shareholders in connection with a new restructuring plan. Id. at 394-95. In applying its
new control person test, the Eleventh Circuit found no evidence that Mendel had any power
over Kinder-Care at the time the prospectus was issued. Id. at 397.
193. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985); Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc.,
2 F.3d 613, 619-20 (5th Cir. 1993); Sanders Confectionary Prods., Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc.,
973 F.2d 474, 486 (6th Cir. 1992); Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873,
887 (7th Cir. 1992); First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898 (10th Cir. 1992).
194. 762 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1985).
195. Id. at 631.
196. Id.
197. 84 F.3d at 396 n.6.
198. 62 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1995).
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("Elliott") with the help of William Meihorne ("Meihorne") lost millions
of dollars over a seven-year period. Elliott and Melhorne managed to
attract new investors and retain old investors in spite of poor performance through a ponzi scheme.1 co Elliott and Melhorne were eventually indicted on twenty-two counts of fraud under the Investment
Advisors Act.'
They were also indicted on six counts of securities
fraud, ten counts of mail fraud, and one count of conspiracy, all
stemming from misrepresentations allegedly made by them regarding
the financial position of their collection of investment companies. At
trial, a jury returned a verdict of guilty on all but two charges of mail
fraud, and both Elliott and Meihorne were sentenced to prison.21
On appeal, Elliott and Melhorne contended that the district court
improperly excluded evidence of satisfied customers, and that such an
exclusion was improper because the testimony was relevant to show lack
of intent to defraud. 0 2 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's
ruling excluding the evidence, stating that the impact of the appellants'
misrepresentations was less important than the substance of their
misrepresentations.'c
Thus, the testimony of satisfied customers
would not have negated the testimony concerning appellants' continuous
concealment of millions of dollars of losses.' 4
Elliott and Melhorne also contended they could not be convicted of
investment advisor fraud because they did not have an advisor-client
relationship with the alleged victims of their actions. The Eleventh
Circuit rejected this argument, relying on an SEC interpretive release
that clarified the application of the Investment Advisors Act to financial
planners, pensions consultants, and other financial service providers. 5
199. Id. at 1306.
200. Id. at 1307. The defendants were indicted under (15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3 and 80b-6).
201. Id
202. Id. at 1308.
203. I&
204. Id
205. Id. at 1309-10. Applicability of the Investment Advisors Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a
Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisors Act Release No. IA-1092, 52
Fed. Reg. 38400, 38401-02 (1987). This release states:
[W]hether a person providing financially related services of the type discussed in
this release is an investment advisor within the meaning of the Advisors Act
depends upon all the relevant facts and circumstances .... A determination as
to whether a person providing financial planning, pension consulting, or other
integrated advisory services is an investment advisor will depend upon whether
such person: (1) provides advice, or issues reports or analyses, regarding
securities; (2) is in the business of providing such services; and (3) provides such
services for compensation.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The court also relied on section 80b-2(a)(11) of the Act itself, which
states that an investment advisor is
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the
value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing,
or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular
business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities. 0
The court found that both Elliott and Melhorne had clearly provided
investment advice, were "in the business of advising others, and did so
'for compensation."'2 7 The court further found that both Elliott and
Melhorne held Elliott out as an investment advisor, received compensation clearly definable as being transaction-based compensation, and
provided investment advice on more than a few rare or isolated
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded both Elliott and
occasions.'
Melhorne were "in the business" of advising others and were compensated for such investment advice.2'
The court also rejected Elliott and Melhorne's contention that even if
they were investment advisors, they could not be held liable under the
Act because there was no advisor-client relationship. 210 The court
quoted section 80b-6(4) of the Act, 2" stating that subsection (4) is "a
general prohibition against certain conduct by an investment adviThe Eleventh Circuit therefore concluded the Investment
sor."
Advisors Act did not require the victim to be in an advisor-client
both Elliott and
relationship with the purported advisor and affirmed
218
Melhorne's convictions under the terms of the Act.

206. 62 F.3d at 1309 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(aX11)).
207. Id. at 1310.
208. Id. See SEC Release, supro note 205, at 38402.
209. 62 F.3d at 1311.
210. 1& at 1311-12.
211. Id. at 1311. Section 80b-6(4) of the Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
investment advisor, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, directly or indirectly- ... (4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative". Id.
212. 62 F.3d at 1311-12.
213. Id. at 1314. The court in Elliott also concluded that "restitution must be limited
to the losses attributable to the 19 victims named in the government's amended
indictment." Id. (citing Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990)). The restitution was
not governed by the 1990 amendment to the Victim and Witness Protection Act because
defendants had completed their offenses prior to the effective date of the Act. Id.
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V. ARBITRATION
In the years since the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon2 14 and 1989 decision in Rodriguez de

Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,"' which overruled Wilko
v. Swan,216 customer agreements requiring disputes to be submitted
217
to arbitration have become standard in the securities industry
Consequently, the number of securities-related matters submitted to
arbitration has been steadily rising.21
Yet in spite of the everincreasing popularity of arbitration, very little case law exists to guide
the securities practitioner in asserting or defending a claim in the

arbitration forum.2 19 Additionally, although arbitration decisions are

now subject to minimum content criteria,220 these opinions rarely
provide the type of substantive guidance found in some court opinions.
Thus, the arbitration of a securities dispute is a relatively undeveloped
area of the law. Recently, however, both the United States Supreme
Court and the Eleventh Circuit have faced important questions of first
impression in this area of emerging importance to the securities
practitioner.

214. 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (ruling that claims arising under Rule 10b-5 and RICO could
be the subject of a binding arbitration agreement).
215. 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (ruling that claims arising under the Securities Act could be
arbitrated).
216. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In Wilco, the Supreme Court held that agreements to submit
disputes to arbitration were void for claims brought pursuant to section 12(2) of the
Securities Act. Rodriguez overruled Wilco, finding such agreements enforceable under the
Federal Arbitration Act.
217. Harold S. Bloomenthal & Holme Roberts & Owen, Securities Law Handbook 1997;
Class and Derivative Litigation in the Reform Era at 1646 (Glasser LegalWorks Seminars,
Sixth Ann. Institute 1996). See also Deborah Masucci, SecuritiesArbitration-A Success
Story: What Does the FutureHold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 183, 188-89 (Spring 1996);
Karen Kupersmith, A Perspectiveon the Role of the Arbitratorin SecuritiesArbitration,31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 297 (Spring 1996).
218. For example, the number of arbitrations filed with the National Association of
Securities Dealers has increased from 4,150 cases filed in 1991 to 6,056 filed in 1995.
These statistics were acquired from the NASD Economic Research Department, 1735 K
Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20006. See also Masucci, supra note 217, 188-89.
219. See James E. Beckley, Equity & Arbitration, in SEcuRITIEs ARBITRATION 1996, at
31 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7147, 1996).
220. Masucci, supra note 217, at 190.
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ArbitratingArbitrability

m ' the Supreme Court
In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,"
addressed two issues arising under the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA7). 2 First, the Court addressed the manner with which a
district court should review an arbitrator's decision as to whether parties
have agreed to arbitrate a dispute.' Second, the Court addressed the
manner with which a court of appeals should review a district court's
decision confirming or refusing to vacate an arbitration award."A
First Options arose when a stock clearing firm sought arbitration
against an investment company, and the husband and wife owners of the
investment company, for debts incurred following the stock market crash
of 1987.'
The husband and wife (the "Kaplans") never personally
signed any documents containing an arbitration clause and therefore
"forcefully" objected to the arbitrators' jurisdiction over them individually.'mS Rather than seeking a court order enjoining the arbitration, the
Kaplans objected by filing a written memorandum with the arbitrators.'
The arbitrators determined the Kaplans were subject to
arbitration and ruled against them on the merits of the underlying
dispute. The Kaplans subsequently asked the district court to vacate the
arbitration award. The district court confirmed the award, but the Third
Circuit reversed.
The Third Circuit was later affirmed by the Supreme
s
Court.n
In affirming the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court divided the
arbitrability issue into three "disagreements."m The first disagreement was whether the individuals were personally liable for the

221. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995)
222. Id at 1922.
223. Id.
224. I&
225. Id. at 1923.
226. Id. at 1925. First Options attempted to argue that the Kaplans clearly agreed to
arbitration by submitting the arbitrability issue to the arbitrators. The Court dismissed
this argument, stating the Kaplans' actions showed the opposite, i.e., that they clearly
objected to the arbitrators' jurisdiction over their dispute. The Court bolstered this
conclusion by noting (1) there was "an obvious explanation for the Kaplans' presence before
the arbitrators (i.e., that MKI, Mr. Kaplan's wholly owned firm, was arbitrating workout
agreement matters); and (2) Third Circuit law... suggest[s] that the Kaplans might argue
arbitrability to the arbitrators without losing their right to independent court review." Id.
(citing Teamsters v. Western Pa. Motor Carriers Ass'n, 574 F.2d 783, 786-88 (3d Cir.
1978)).
227. 115 S. Ct. at 1925.
228. Id at 1925-26.
229. Id at 1925.
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investment company's debt to the claimant. This disagreement
concerned the merits of the dispute. The second disagreement was
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the first dispute. This disagreement was the arbitrability dispute. The third disagreement was "who
should have the primary power to decide the second matter.' ° The
Court considered only the third question."1 The Court framed the
issue of who should decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate as a
question concerning the type of review a district court should exercise
over an arbitrability decision by arbitrators. 2 The Court noted that
if the district court reviewed the decision deferentially, then the arbitrability decision was essentially left to the arbitrators, whereas de novo
review would allow the courts to draw their own conclusions."
The Court began its analysis in First Options by noting that the
arbitrability question turned upon "the fact that arbitration is simply a
matter of contract between the parties.' 2 Thus, the arbitrability of
the dispute was found to be dependent upon the parties' agreement
regarding the submission of the arbitrability question itself to arbitration." The Court next determined that in deciding whether there was
an agreement to arbitrate arbitrability, "courts generally... should
apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of
contracts ... [but] should not assume that the parties agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clear and unmistakable' evidence
that they did so." '
In stating that courts should not assume parties have agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability, the Court recognized it was treating the question
of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the arbitrability dispute in a
different manner than it generally treated the question of whether a
particular dispute was arbitrable.8 7 The presumption in the first
instance, as to whether there was an agreement to arbitrate arbitrability, is that parties do not generally agree to arbitrate the issue of
arbitrability.2w In contrast, the presumption in the second instance,
as to whether the merits of a particular dispute are within the scope of
an otherwise valid arbitration agreement, is to be resolved in favor of

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
(1986);
237.
238.

Id. at 1923.
Id. at 1923-24.
Id
I.
Id. at 1924.
Id.
Id. (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649
citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995)).
Id.
Id.
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arbitration.'
The Court supported this variant treatment by stating
it was necessary in light of the substantial rights given up when a party
is required to arbitrate.' "The latter question arises when the parties
have a contract that provides for arbitration of some issues. In such
circumstances, the parties likely gave at least some thought to the scope
of arbitration."24 1 On the other hand, when individuals do not clearly
agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, it is doubtful
the parties thought about the significance of having arbitrators decide
the scope of their agreement.'
Thus, because'"a party can be forced
to arbitrate only those issues if specifically has agreed to submit to
arbitration," the Court concluded the arbitrability of the parties' dispute
was subject to the independent review of the courts.'
The Supreme Court next addressed in FirstOptions the standard with
which a court of appeals should review a district court's decision
confirming or refusing to vacate an arbitration award. 24 The Court
adopted the Third Circuit's de novo approach, expressly disagreeing with
the Eleventh Circuit's policy of applying a particularly lenient "abuse of
discretion" standard to both questions of law and fact when a district
court confirms, but not when it sets aside, an arbitration award.' 5
The Court stated that ordinary standards of review should be applied
when reviewing a district court decision upholding an arbitration award.
Thus, findings of fact that are not "clearly erroneous" should be accepted,
but questions of law should be decided de novo.'
An issue similar to that addressed by the Supreme Court in First
Options was recently addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen. 7 In Merrill Lynch, an
arbitration claim was filed with the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") for alleged violations of Florida Blue Sky provisions,

239. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614

(1985)).
240. Id. at 1923-24. ("[Who--court or arbitrator-has the primary authority to decide
whether a party has agreed to arbitrate can make a critical difference to a party resisting
arbitration.").
241. Id. at 1924.
242. Id. at 1925.
243. Id. at 1925-26. The Court's conclusion is in accordance with the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Wheat, First Securities, Inc. v. Green, 993 F.2d 814, 815 (11th Cir. 1993). For
a discussion of Wheat, see John Latham & Jay Sloman, Securities Regulation, 46 MERCER
L. REV. 1463, 1485-88 (1995).
244. 115 S. Ct. at 1926.
245. Id. (citing Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679,681-82 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Robbins v. PaineWebber, Inc., 506 U.S. 870 (1992)).
246. Id.
247. 62 F.3d 381 (11th Cir. 1995).
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common-law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and other similar torts.
The claimants had purchased limited partnership interests from a
financial consultant at Merrill Lynch, at which time they entered into
standard customer agreements requiring all disputes to be resolved by
NASD arbitration.
Merrill Lynch responded to the statement of claim by filing an action
in Florida state court to enjoin the arbitration on the ground that the
claims were time-barred by section 15 of the NASD Code."
The
claimants then removed the action to federal court, moved to compel
arbitration, and filed a motion to stay the federal action pending
arbitration. The district court granted the claimants' motion to compel,
ruling that the question of whether the claims were time-barred was a
question for the arbitrators. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the decision, finding section 15 to be a "substantive eligibility requirement" requiring determination by the district court.2 9
In ruling that courts rather than arbitrators should address limitations disputes, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that Belke v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith2 1 or section 35 of the NASD
Code 251 demanded a contrary result. Recognizing a split in the circuits
on the issue, 252 the court reiterated that arbitration is essentially a
creature of contract.2' Thus, the court looked to the parties' agree248. Id. at 382. Former NASD Code section 15, now Rule 10304, provides:
No dispute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible for submission to arbitration
under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event
giving rise to the act or dispute, claim, or controversy. This section shall not
extend applicable statutes of limitations, nor shall it apply to any case which is
directed to arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Id.
249. 62 F.3d at 383.
250. 693 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that where an arbitration agreement
required notice of intent to arbitrate, the issue of whether failure to serve notice barred
arbitration was a procedural question to be resolved by the arbitrators).
251. Former NASD Code section 35, now Rule 10324, provides:
The arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the applicability
of all provisions under this Code and to take appropriate action to obtain
compliance with any ruling by the arbitrator(s). Such interpretations and actions
to obtain compliance shall be final and binding upon the parties.
252. 62 F.3d at 383. The court noted, "Our sister circuits have grappled with this issue
and reached conflicting results." Id (citing the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits as
holding section 15 must be applied by the courts, PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofinann, 984 F.2d
1372, 1374 (3rd Cir. 1993); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995 F.2d 649, 651 (6th
Cir. 1993); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 1992), and the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits as holding section 15 is an issue to be addressed by the
arbitrators, Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1995); FSC
Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994)).
253. 62 F.3d at 383.
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Additionally, because the
ment to determine their intentions. 2"
agreement incorporated the NASD Code, the court looked to the Code for
guidance, finding the plain language of section 15 to support the
conclusion
"that [section] 15 is a jurisdictional prerequisite to arbitra2
tion."n
The Eleventh Circuit also cited the Supreme Court's decision in First
Options' for the proposition that the "presumption in favor of arbitration is not applicable when the question to be resolved is who decides
arbitrability.25 7 The court concluded that based on First Options it
could not assume the parties in the case at bar -Agreed to, arbitrate
arbitrability absent clear and unmistakable evidence that they had done
so.2" The court noted that section 35 of the NASD Code did not
qualify as clear and unmistakable evidence, finding, "at most, section 35
creates an ambiguity as to who determines arbitrability. 25 9 Such
ambiguity was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the
The Eleventh
courts should determine the arbitrability issue.'
Circuit therefore concluded the district court, as opposed to the
arbitrators, should determine whether the dispute was time-barred
under section 15 of the NASD Code. 261
B. Punitive Damage Awards
"One of the most frequently litigated issues in the realm of securities
arbitration has been the ability of arbitrators to award punitive
damages. 62 In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,2"

254. Id. at 384.
255. Id.
256. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
257. 62 F.3d at 384.
258. Id.
259. Id. For the text of NASD Code section 35, see supra note 251.
260. 62 F.3d at 384.
261. Id. at 385. The Eleventh Circuit also determined in MerrillLynch that the actual
purchase date of the securities involved did not necessarily control the limitations period.
The court ruled that if the claimants could prove Merrill Lynch reported false values, then
the act of sending these false statements, as opposed to the initial purchase of the
investments, could be considered the "occurrence or event" giving rise to the claimants'
claims. Id. The court therefore remanded the action, stating that the district court should
examine each claim to determine which act was the "occurrence or event" and to determine
whether more than six years had elapsed from that event. Id. The Eleventh Circuit
recognized its holding "may compel federal courts to hold 'mini-trials' on timeliness, which
may be -followed by full arbitration if the claims are not deemed time-barred," but
concluded judicial economy should not interfere with a binding agreement to arbitrate. Id.
(citing Goldberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1422 (11th Cir. 1990)).
262. Annual Review of Federal SecuritiesRegulation, 51 BUS. LAW. 511, 541 (1996).
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the Supreme Court addressed this subject in the context of a New York
choice-of-law provision, an issue that had split the circuits.2 Under
New York law, punitive damages may only be awarded by courts and not
The issue before the Court in Mastrobuono was
by arbitrators.2'
whether a standard agreement to arbitrate, executed by a customer and
containing a New York choice-of-law provision, prevented the arbitral
forum handling the dispute from awarding punitive damages. The
Supreme Court determined such a provision, in and of itself, does not
prevent arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.2" The decision
is therefore consistent with the 1988 Eleventh Circuit decision in Bonar
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.2 7
In Mastrobuono, husband and wife customers (the "Mastrobuonos") of
Shearson Lehman Hutton ("Shearson") signed a standard client
agreement when they opened a trading account."s This agreement
contained both a choice-of-law provision and an arbitration provision.
The choice-of-law provision appeared in one of the agreement's standard
paragraphs and provided that the entire agreement was governed by the
The arbitration provision was also
laws of the State of New York.'
standard, stating that "any controversy" arising out of the parties'
transactions was to be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules
of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), the Board of
Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, or the Board of Directors of

263. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
264. Id. The Court noted that it granted certiorari "because the Courts ofAppeals have
expressed differing views on whether a contractual choice-of-law provision may preclude
an arbitral award of punitive damages that otherwise would be proper." Id. at 1215 (citing
Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991); Pierson v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
835 F.2d 1378, 1386-88 (l1th Cir. 1988); Raytheon Co. v. Automated Bus. Sys., Inc., 882
F.2d 6 (lst Cir. 1989); Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993)).
265. 115 S.Ct. at 1215.
266. Id
267. 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988). In Bonar, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Dean
Witter's argument that the arbitrators lacked the authority to award punitive damages.
Id. at 1386. The customer agreement in Bonar, like the agreement in Mastrobuono,
contained a New York choice-of-law provision. Id The Eleventh Circuit, citing Willoughby
Roofing & Supply Co. v. KaJima Intl, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 359 (N. D. Ala. 1984), aff'd,
776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985), stated, "a choice of law provision in a contract governed by
the Arbitration Act merely designates the substantive law that the arbitrators must apply
in determining whether the conduct of the parties warrants an award of punitive damages;
it does not deprive the arbitrators of their authority to award punitive damages." Bonar,
835 F.2d at 1387.
268. 115 S. Ct. at 1214-17.
269. Id. at 1216-17.
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the American Stock Exchange.' ° The agreement did not expressly
reference punitive damages.27 '
When the Mastrobuonos asserted claims against Shearson in federal
court, Shearson invoked the arbitration provision. The NASD arbitrators subsequently awarded the Mastrobuonos both compensatory and
punitive damages. Shearson paid the compensatory portion of the award
but filed a motion to vacate the award of punitive damages. The district
court granted Shearson's motion, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.7
Both courts found that the arbitration panel did not have the power to
award punitive damages because the New York rule precluding
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages was incorporated by the
New York choice-of-law provision. 27 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the split in the circuits on the issue. 4
In reversing the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court noted its earlier
decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson 275 and reiterated that
"Congress passed the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act] 'to overcome Courts'
refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate.'" T The Court stated that
in Mastrobuonothe petitioners sought a similar result in that they were
asking the court to hold that the FAA preempts New York's prohibition
against punitive damage awards by arbitrators." 7 However, the Court
avoided the issue of whether the FAA preempts New York's prohibition
on punitive damages, finding that New York procedural law regarding
the award of punitive damages was not incorporated by the New York
choice-of-law provision.278
In concluding the New York choice-of-law provision did not incorporate
New York's prohibition on the award of punitive damages by arbitrators,

270. Id. at 1217.
271. Id.
272. Id at 1214-15.
273. Id. at 1215.
274. Id. See supra note 264.
275. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
276. 115 S. Ct. at 1215.
277. Id. Petitioners also relied on the Court's 1989 decision in Volt Info. Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989), in arguing that
parties to a contract may lawfully agree to waive any claim for punitive damages. The
Court rejected this application of Volt, stating, '(1If contracting parties agree to include
claims for punitive damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their
agreement will be enforced according to its terms even if a rule of state law would
otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration." 115 S. Ct. at 1216. Justice Thomas's
dissent in Mastrobuono is based on his contention that "the choice-of-law provision here
cannot reasonably be distinguished from the one in Volt." Id. at 1219 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
.278. Id. at 1220.
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the Court first looked to the language of the agreement itself. 9 The
Court found that the choice-of-law provision, "when viewed in isolation,"
was merely a substitute for the conflict-of-laws analysis a court would
otherwise go through to determine what law to apply to the dispute
"It is not, in itself, an
arising out of the contractual relationship.'
unequivocal exclusion of punitive damages claims."
The Court next turned to the arbitration provision of the contract,
noting that the arbitration provision, "when read separately... strongly
implies that an arbitral award of punitive damages is appropriate.'
The Court pointed out that the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure
states that arbitrators may award "'damages and other relief," 2 and
an NASD arbitrators' manual states that arbitrators may consider
Thus, the Court determined, "[alt
punitive damages as a remedy.'
most, the choice-of-law clause introduces an ambiguity into an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow punitive damages
awards.' s
Because the arbitration provision in the Mastrobuono's customer
agreement was found to be at best ambiguous, the Court applied the
common-law rule "that a court should construe ambiguous language
against the interest of the party that drafted it,"' and the "cardinal
principal of contract construction: that a document should be read to
give effect to all its provisions and to render them consistent with each
other.'S Consequently, the Court found that "the best way to harmonize the choice-of-law provision with the arbitration provision" was to
read the choice-of-law provision as encompassing only substantive
principles, and not special rules limiting the authority of arbitrators.'
"Thus, the choice-of-law provision covers the rights and duties of the
parties, while the arbitration clause covers arbitration.' 9 Therefore,
if a party wishes to preclude an arbitral forum from awarding punitive
damages, it must now expressly exclude punitive damages from the
purview of the arbitrators or explicitly incorporate New York substantive
law into their agreement to arbitrate.

279. Id. at 1220-21.

280. Id. at 1217.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1218.
283. Id. (citing NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure I 3741(e) (1993)).
284. Id.
285. Id,
286. Id at 1219.
287. Id.
288. Id
289. I&
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C. Due Process Concerns
The Eleventh Circuit recently adopted the Mastrobuono holding in
Davis v. PrudentialSecurities, Inc.,' rejecting as "meritless" petitioner's argument that Mastrobuonowas not applicable to claims arbitrated
before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). 29 ' In Prudential,
an arbitration panel awarded both compensatory and punitive damages
against Prudential Securities, Inc. ("PSI"). PSI contended the arbitrators
lacked the authority to award punitive damages because the arbitration
agreement contained a New York choice-of-law provision. 22" PSI also
contended the confirmation of the punitive damages award by the
district court violated PSrs due process rights.' The claimant crossappealed, asserting that the district court erred in confirming the
arbitrators'
ruling that each party should bear its own attorney fees and
29 4
costs.

In confirming the arbitration panel's award of punitive damages, the
Eleventh Circuit first noted that in accordance with the Supreme Court's
decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan," the court would
review findings of fact according to a clearly erroneous standard, but
decide questions of law de novo.'
The court recognized that such a
standard was contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's prior approach in
reviewing confirmation awards,' but rejected the former standard as
contrary to First Options."' The court also found that because
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.' was directly on point,
petitioner's argument that the New York choice-of-law provision
prevented the arbitrators from awarding punitive damages was no
longer valid.3' Thus, the primary issue before the court was PSIs
contention that the district court's confirmation of the punitive damages
award violated the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

290.
291.
292.
293.

59 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1187.
Id.

294. 141

295. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
296. 59 F.3d at 1188.
297. See Robbinsv. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 681-82 (llthCir.),cert. denied sub nom. Robbins
v.PainWebber, Inc., 506 U.S. 870 (1992).
298. 59 F.3d at 1188.
299. 115 S.Ct. 1212 (1995).
300. 59 F.3d at 1188-89.
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PSI contended that the district court's confirmation of the damages
award violated due process because arbitration "lacks the procedural
protections and meaningful judicial review required for the imposition
of punitive damages." °1 In disagreeing with PSI's contention, the
Eleventh Circuit noted, "it is axiomatic that constitutional due process
protections 'do not extend to "private conduct abridging individual
rights."'"
The court followed the inquiry set forth by the Supreme
Court in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian' to determine whether the requisite state action existed, concluding "the state
action 3element
of a due process claim is absent in private arbitration
4
cases.
The court also rejected PSrs contention that the district court's
confirmation of the award violated due process concerns pursuant to "the
Shelley v. Kraemer30° theory that a court's enforcement of a private
contract constitutes state action."3 6 The court noted that subsequent
cases have interpreted state action narrowly and "have rejected the
argument that the limited state action inherent in the confirmation of
private arbitration awards mandates compliance with the Due Process
Clause." 7 The court distinguished Honda Motor Co. u. Obergs on
the basis that Honda involved an award of punitive damages by a jury
rather than a panel of arbitrators.a"o The court also noted that federal
policy favors arbitration and that arbitration lacks "the bias and
runaway punitive awards prevalent in the jury context.3 10 Additionally, the court found that as a voluntary participant in the arbitration,
"PSI may not require customers to arbitrate under the terms of an
account agreement that PSI drafted and later complain about the

301. Id.
302. Id.
303. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
304. 59 F.3d at 1191. This conclusion is in agreement with other courts that have
decided the issue. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Air Florida Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d
833, 842 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Elmore v. Chicago & Ill. Midland R.R., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th
Cir. 1987); International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers Local Union
42 v. Absolute Envtl. Servs., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 392, 402-03 (D. Del. 1993); Austern v.
Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
305. 334 U.S. 1, 19020 (1948) (holding that a court order enforcing a racially restrictive
covenant constitutes state action).
306. 59 F.3d at 1191.
307. Id.
308. 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (finding due process concerns mandate that some degree of
judicial review of punitive damage awards be imposed in state court actions).
309. 59 F.3d at 1193.
310. Id. The court cited no authority for this statement.
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adequacy of the procedures afforded by the forum' of its own choosing.""' Thus, the punitive damages award was upheld. 12
The court next considered the claimant's cross-appeal on the issue of

attorney fees, ruling that an arbitrator can only bind the parties on
issues they have agreed to submit to arbitration. The court determined
that although the statement of claim requested costs and general
damages were to be argued before the arbitrators, "these actions [do not]
amount to a submission of the issue of attorney fees for determination." ' Thus, because the attorney fees issue was not properly
submitted to the arbitrators, the court held they exceeded their powers
in ordering that each side pay their own fees.814 Consequently, the
court vacated the district court's judgment to the extent it confirmed the
arbitrators' attorney fees determination. 1 '
VI. SEC PROCEEDINGS
the former president of two securities brokerIn Sheldon
age firms appealed an SEC finding that he had violated federal
securities laws and regulations and failed to adequately supervise his
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the SEC's order barring
firms.
petitioner from associating with any securities broker or dealer, finding
that the SEC's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence.318 The court also found that various criticisms against the
SEC's general operating procedures were without merit.1 9 In particular, the court "join[edl the Second and Ninth Circuits in rejecting the
contention that the SEC's Rule 2(e) is improper or otherwise taints the
fairness of proceedings before the SEC."'
v. SEC 8

311. Id. The court also noted that in Mastrobuono, the Supreme Court upheld an
arbitration award of punitive damages in an amount greater than the award at issue in
Prudential. Id.
312. I&
313. Id. at 1195.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. 45 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1995).
317. Id. at 1516-17.
318. Id. at 1517.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1518. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 579 (2d Cir. 1979); Davy
v. SEC, 792 F.2d 1418, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1986). Rule 2(e) provides:
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing
or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission
after notice of an opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the
requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or
integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct or (iii)
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The court also disagreed with petitioner's contention that the
Administrative Law Judge ("AIX) proceedings violated the separation
of powers doctrine and denied broker-dealers due process of law. 2 '
Citing Elliott v. SEC, 822 the court noted, "[ain agency may combine
investigative, adversarial, and adjudicative functions, as long as no
employees serve in dual roles."
The court therefore determined that
because in Sheldon "SEC employees gathered and presented the
evidence, while the ALJ, an independent adjudicator, heard that
evidence," the SEC had not acted improperly."s '
VII. PENDING CASES
On January 17, 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorarim in
United States v. O'Hagan,"' a case rejecting the applicability of the
misappropriation theory as a basis of liability for fraudulent insider
trading. The application of the misappropriation theory in the securities
context had caused a split among the circuits. The Second, Third,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits adopted the misappropriation theory,327
whereas the Fourth and Eighth Circuits found that section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 should not be read so broadly."2 The Eleventh Circuit does
not appear to have addressed the issue.
Only days before this Article was published, the Supreme Court
32
handed down its decision in O'Hagan.
In an opinion authored by
Justice Ginsburg, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and ruled that
criminal liability under section 10(b) may be predicated upon the
misappropriation theory. The indictment in O'Hagan alleged that
"O'Hagan, in breach of a duty of trust and confidence he owed to his law
firm... and to his client.., traded on the basis of nonpublic informa-

to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any
provision of the Federal securities laws ... or the rules and regulations
thereunder.
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(eXl) (1994). Petitioner contended the rule intimidated attorneys. 45
F.3d at 1518.
321. Id.
322. 36 F.3d 86 (11th Cir. 1994).
323. 45 F.3d at 1519 (quoting Elliot, 36 F.3d at 87).
324. Id. at 1519.
325. 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
326. 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
327. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d
197 (2d Cir. 1984); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Cherif, 933
F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
328. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. O'Hagan, 92
F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
329. United States v. O'Hagan, No. 96-842, 1997 WL 345229 (June 25, 1997).
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tion regarding [his client's] planned tender offer.' ° -The Court found
that O'Hagan's conduct, as defined in the indictment, constituted a
fraudulent device in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.ss ' O'Hagan's convictions pursuant to section 10(b) were therefore
upheld. 2
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The most significant development during the survey period was the
enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which
imposes a number of substantial changes in the securities area.
Although it is still too soon to tell whether the PSLRA will fulfill the
intentions of its drafters, it clearly presents a number of new issues to
be dealt with by those practicing under its provisions. It is therefore
anticipated that future articles for this Eleventh Circuit Survey will
include much discussion of decisions rendered under the PSLRA.

330. l at 6.
331. Id.
332. The Court also determined in O'Hagan that the Securities and Exchange
Commission had not exceeded "its rulemaking authority by adopting Rule 14e-3(a), which
proscribes trading on undisclosed information in the tender offer setting, even in the
absence of a duty to disclose." Id. at 3.

